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ABSTRACT
DATE: December 11, 1967
FROM: J. A. Llewellyn
The Launch Complex 37 lightning strike of July 27,
1967, was reviewed and compared to a similar incident on the
Gemini Program.
Available data indicate little likelihood of damag-
ing currents having been present in SA-204 Launch Vehicle or
the ground equipment during the July 27th incident. Based on
the results of subsystem and system testing after the strike,
anticipated results of future testing, the six months elapsed
time between the strike and launch, and the fact that much of
the critical airborne electrical/electronic equipment has been
removed since the strike for other reasons, no new actions are
considered necessary at this time.
In the Gemini case, significant failures occurred in
both airborne and ground circuits. Due to the resultant semi-
conductor uncertainty, and the relatively short time prior to
planned launch, all critical airborne components containing
semiconductors were replaced, and a sophisticated data comparison
task was implemented.
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INTRODUCTION
DATE: De cemb er 11, 1967
FROM: J. A. Llewellyn
At the request of Mr. W. C. Schneider, Apollo Mission
Director, a brief review of the lightning strike incident which
occurred at Launch Complex 37 on July 27, 1967, was conducted.
The incident was compared to a similar incident which occurred
on the Gemini Program.
LAUNCH COMPLEX 37 STRIKE
SA-204 was erected at Launch Complex 37 and under-
going integrated system testing when the strike occurred at
approximately 2:30 P.M. LM-l had not yet been stacked; there
was, however, a protective hat above the IU. An eyewitness
inside the IU reported a flash in the IU near the forward end
of the S-IVB Stage. Other reporting established that light-
ning did indeed strike the top of the service structure near
the stiff leg derrick; lightning instrumentation recorded
50,000 amperes. No service structure damage was found during
later inspections. However, a burned spot was found on the
derrick, and an anemometer located in the area had been
knocked off its mount, probably by the strike. (1)
At this point in time it is somewhat controversial
as to whether or not lightning really got inside the silo.
Feelings are that the reported flash observation inside the
silo could have been a reflection. Inspectors who conducted
thorough visual inspections of the area - as well as the re-
mainder of the launch vehicle - were unable to uncover any
evidence of an actual strike. One element of spacecraft GSE,
the cI4--240 ACE (Acceptance Checkout Equipment) unit, was
found later to be inoperative. It was thought that this
failure - a total of seven circuit boards were inoperative -
was caused by the strike; however, this apparently was never
confirmed.
SUbsequent to the incident a number of special system
reverification tests were conducted, none of which showed any
launch vehicle or ground equipment performance deterioration.
A number of all-systems tests have been and will be conducted
prior to launch; these are:
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1. Sequence Malfunction Test (completed)
2. Plugs-In Overall Test (completed
3. Plugs-Out Overall Test (completed)
4. Launch Vehicle - MCC - Houston
Interface Test (completed)
5. Flight Readiness Test
6. Countdown Demonstration Test.
The tests which have been conducted have given no evidence of
system performance deterioration due to lightning.
GEI\lINI STRIKE
Gemini Launch Vehicle number 2 experienced a similar
incident while at Cape Kennedy. In that case, however, a
fairly large number of electrical ground support equipment
components failed, as well as 8 airborne pressure transducers.
All other airborne and ground equipment was tested and found
to be functioning. However, since large currents were known
to have been present in the airborne and ground circuits
(from component failure data), and because of the unknown
state of the semiconductor devices, and the rather limited
time between incident and scheduled launch (4 - 6 weeks),
essentially all of the flight critical airborne packages con-
taining semiconductors were replaced. A complete subsystem
and system re-evaluation with sophisticated data comparison
(to pre-incident data) was conducted prior to continuing into
the normal all-systems test. There were no component failures
either airborne or ground equipment - experienced after the
initial components which were thought to have been failed by
the Ll gh t n i.ng s+:r:i ke were removed. In other words, the fear
that current/voltage overstressing of semiconductor devices,
in equipment which was not replaced, would cause failures
later, never materialized. (2)
CONCLUSIONS
It is felt that additional post-lightning incident
measures are not required on Apollo 5 or Launch Complex 37
equipment at this time due to the following considerations:
1. There is no direct evidence that abnormal currents
were present in airborne circuits.
2. A good percentage of the IU electrical/electronic
equipment has been removed, inspected, tested, and
reinstalled or replaced, for other reasons. Examples
are: Digital Computer, Digital Adapter, Control
Signal Processor, Rate Gyros, Control Accelerometers
and Signal Conditioners, Flight Control Computer, and
the Platform Electronic Assembly.
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3. A significant amount of both sUbsystem and system
testing has been and will be accomplished prior to
launch, which should expose failed or degraded
components.
4. Approximately six months will have elapsed between
strike and launch. This time, and the normal stress-
ing due to repeated on-off cycling should be ample to
"bring out lT latent failure conditions.
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